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Migration, the Quality of the Labour Force and Economic Inequality
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Mobility of workers involves flows of labour, human capital and other production factors and 
thus contributes to a more efficient allocation of resources. Besides these effects on 
allocative efficiency, migrant flows affect relative wages and also change the international 
and national distribution of skills and thereby equality in the receiving society. This paper 
suggests that skilled immigration promotes economic equality in advanced economies under 
standard conditions. The context is theoretically explained in a core model and empirically 
documented using unique data from the WIID database and OECD. 
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1. Introduction 
International flows of people are an integral part of the globalized world economy.
1 Economic 
migration involves flows of labour, human capital and other production factors and thus, at 
least in theory, contributes to a more efficient allocation of resources and welfare of nations. 
Yet, the distributional effects of migration may be considerable, as one of the main 
repercussions of migration is that it changes the composition of the labour force in the 
receiving and sending countries. These effects are especially far-reaching if migrant flows 
change the distribution of skills in the labour force. This is the case if, for example, a country 
experiences a steady inflow of workers whose skill level is on average higher (or lower) than 
the skill level of the typical native worker. The induced changes in the composition of the 
labour force have the direct effects on inequality through changing the shares of “poor” and 
“rich” people in the economy. Furthermore, they affect the wages of high and low skilled 
labour in the economy. Finally, individuals may react to such changes in labour force quality
2 
by changing their investment decisions, including those regarding their investment into 
human capital acquisition.
3 
  The economic consequences of migration have been one of the central topics of labour 
economics since the early works of Chiswick (1978, 1980) and Borjas (1983, 1985). While 
various distributional effects have been considered in the ensuing literature that we 
summarize below, there is little evidence on the relationship between migration and 
inequality. Yet, it is mainly the distributional effects of migration that drive public attitudes 
towards immigration and the related policy discourse (see Zimmermann, 2005).   
                                                 
1 United Nations (UN) estimates that the share of international migrants in the total world population was 2.4% in 
1965, 2.3% in 1985 and reached 3.0% in 2005. In the developed world, including Europe, Northern America, 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan, the corresponding share reached 9.5% in 2005. See United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision Population Database. 
2 We measure the quality of the labour force by the incidence of skilled workers in it. We define skilled and 
unskilled workers by their highest attained levels of education, albeit we understand that skill is a broader 
category than education. 
3 As another example, low skill immigration may increase the overall quality of the labour force, if it brings about 
a larger increase in the quality of the native labour force.   3
In this paper we theoretically and empirically study the relationships between 
economic inequality, the quality of the labour force and international migration. We consider 
these relationships from the perspective of developed countries that receive inflows of 
migrants that vary across countries and over time in terms of their skill composition 
(Zimmermann, 2005).  
We proceed as follows. The next section maps the relevant literature. We then develop 
a simple model that links inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient and the share of 
skilled workers in the labour force. In this model we illustrate the effects of skilled and 
unskilled immigration. Section 4 provides empirical evidence on the link between inequality, 
labour force quality, and migration and establishes some stylised facts about these 
relationships. Next, we empirically investigate the relationship between inequality and labour 
force quality using country statistics from the 2007 OECD Statistical Compendium and a 
unique compilation of inequality data provided by the WIDER institute at the United Nations 
University in 2007. As a third step, we study the overall relationship between the share of 
immigrants in the labour force and its quality. We then discuss the policy relevance of our 
findings and conclude.      
 
2. Theories of Economic Impact of Migration 
The impact of immigration on the destination labour market has been modelled by a number 
of studies, including Chiswick, Chiswick and Karras (1992) and Chiswick (1980, 1998). The 
key factor driving the effects of migration on income inequality in receiving countries in these 
models is the substitutability or complementarity of immigrant and native labour. While the 
early empirical studies (Grossman, 1982; Borjas, 1983; Borjas, 1987) report labour market 
effects of immigration of small magnitudes, more recent studies provide evidence of diverse 
and non-negligible effects. Using data from the 1990 US census, Card (2001) distinguishes 
the effects of immigration for various occupational groups and finds significant negative   4
employment effects in most cases. In a similar study, Orrenius and Zavodny (2007) find 
negative wage effects of immigration on unskilled natives but do not find significant effects in 
skilled occupations. Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) report that immigration explains a 
significant proportion of the increase in the wage gap between high and low skill labour in the 
US in the 1980s and early 1990s. Negative wage effects of immigrants on their co-ethnics in 
the same linguistic group are reported by Chiswick and Miller (2002). In a natural experiment 
setting of the Mariel boatlift, which brought an influx 45,000 Cubans into Miami in 1980, 
Card (1990) finds that any effects of unexpected immigration were cancelled out by mobility 
response of natives and former immigrants.
4 
  The international evidence is mixed, ranging from weak negative effects on 
employment or wages found by Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1993), Hunt (1992, 
Carrington and de Lima (1996), Angrist and Kugler (2003) and Roy (1987), through non-
significant effects reported by Pischke and Velling (1997), Akbari and DeVoretz (1992), 
Dustmann, Fabbai, and Preston (2005), Addison and Worwick (2002), Roy (1997), Friedberg 
(2001) and Zorlu and Hartog (2005), to positive effects found by Chapman and Cobb-Clark 
(1999) and Parasnis, Fausten and Smyth (2006). De New and Zimmermann (1994) support 
the complementarity hypothesis by finding negative effects of (largely unskilled) immigration 
on the wages of the German unskilled but positive wage effects on the wages of native high-
skilled. The book edited by Zimmermann (2005) summarizes migration experiences since the 
Second World War for European countries and the US, Canada and New Zealand. The 
conclusion obtained is that immigration is largely beneficial for the receiving countries, since, 
besides phases of adjustment, there is no overall evidence that natives' wages are strongly 
depressed or that unemployment is substantially increasing as a consequence of immigration. 
                                                 
4 Borjas (1999, 2003, 2006) and Filler (1992) provide further evidence on the negative effects of immigration in 
the US.   5
Immigrant adjustment is another important determinant of immigrant-native labour 
market disparities. The works of Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985) initiated a large body of 
literature depicting immigrant adjustment and the roles of the immigrant’s lack of skills 
specific to and experience in the host country, migrant (self-)selection and cohort effects. 
Constant and Zimmermann (2008) discuss the role of ethnicity and its dynamics on 
immigrants’ labour market outcomes and Kahanec (2007) develops a model of persevering 
skill and occupational specialization of ethnic minorities. Dustmann, Frattini and Preston 
(2007) provide evidence that immigrants temporarily downgrade to less skilled occupations 
than they are qualified for due to incomplete transferability of their skills upon arrival.  
  These interactions between immigrants and natives determine how immigrants fare 
across the earnings distribution in host societies. This issue has been addressed by a 
significant body of literature, including Borjas (1990, 1995) that focus on mean immigrant-
native earnings gaps and Butcher and DiNardo (2002) and Chiswick, Le and Miller (2008) 
who investigate this gap at different deciles of earnings distribution. This literature generally 
reports significant earnings gaps whose magnitudes and determinants vary by gender, year 
and immigrant cohort as well as across the deciles of the earnings distribution. Employment 
gaps between immigrants and natives in the US labour market are documented by Chiswick, 
Cohen and Zach (1997), among others. Borjas (1986) reports higher self-employment rates 
among immigrants than natives. Gaps in various measures of labour market outcomes of 
immigrants and natives in other developed countries are reported by a number of studies, 
including Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2007) for Spain, Constant and Massey (2003) for 
Germany and Wheatly Price (1999) and Dustmann, Fabbri, Preston and Wadsworth (2003) 
for the UK.  
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3. The Theoretical Model 
In this section we develop an analytical labour market model that relates inequality to skill 
composition of the labour force and then explicate its predictions for the inequality effects of 
migration. Following Kahanec and Zimmermann (2008), we consider an economy of size one 
with  L low-skilled and  1 SL =−  high-skilled workers earning wages  l w  and  h w , 
respectively, where we let  lh ww θ = .
5 Consider a specific case with the Constant Elasticity 
of Substitution (CES) production function  () ()
1
1 1 1 CL S
ρ ρ ρ α
− − − =+ , where  ε ρ 1 =  and  0 ε >  
is the (finite) elasticity of substitution of high- and low-skilled labour in a competitive 
industry and  1 α >  is the efficiency shift factor of skilled relative to unskilled labour. Under 




=−  and the earnings of an unskilled relative to a skilled 
worker are θ α . We first consider the natural case where the earnings of high-skilled workers 




















           
and that there is a nondegenerate range 
12 LL within the interval [0,1] where  () GL is 
increasing in L. In fact, whenever  ( ] 0,1 ε ∈ ,  ( ) 0 dG L dL >  for any  () 0,1 L∈ . For  1 ε > , 
() GL is increasing within and decreasing outside of 
12 LL, that is, for very low and very high 
                                                 
5 That is, we normalize the size of the labour force to unity and L denotes also the share of lows-skilled workers.  
6 The Gini coefficient is the area between the line of perfect equality, the 45 degree line, and the Lorenz curve 
() z λ , depicting the share of economy’s income accruing to the λ  poorest individuals, divided by the area 
between the line of perfect equality and the line of perfect inequality. The line of perfect inequality attains zero 
for any  [ ) 1 , 0 ∈ λ  and  () 11 z = .   7
values of L. It turns out that the range 
12 LL tends to be quite large.
7 Parametric values 
determine which  ( ) 0,1 L∈  are admissible with respect to the condition  1 θ α <  and which 
are not. We denote 
* L  the value of L at which  1 θ α = . In the Appendix we show that 
()
*1 1 1 1 1 L
ρ ρ αα
−− =+ , 
1*2 LLL <<, and  1 θ α <  for any  ( )
*,1 LL ∈  and  1 θ α >  for any 
()
* 0, LL ∈ .
8 It turns out that for the values of  ( )
* 0, LL ∈  the Gini coefficient equals  ( ) GL − . 
Note that these results imply that for OECD economies with a large share of skilled labour the 
relevant segment of  ( ) GL is decreasing in the share of skilled labour, 1-L, for the most part 
and may pick up for  ()
* 0, LL ∈ , where, counterfactually, the low-skilled earn more than the 
high-skilled. 
  This result enables us to consider the effects of changes in L that occur when 
immigrants of different skill composition (vis-à-vis the natives) enter (leave) the economy 
under the conditions of flexible wages. For example, for  ( )
*2 , LL L ∈  an inflow of immigrants 
who are on average more skilled than the natives decreases inequality in the economy.
9  
  To summarize, theory predicts that inequality is decreasing with skilled immigration 
for moderate to high values and may be increasing for very high values of the share of skilled 
labour, 1-L. In advanced economies such as the OECD countries where skilled labour is 
abundant and under the natural case where skilled workers earns more than unskilled ones this 
prediction implies that skilled immigration decreases inequality. 
 
 
                                                 
7 For example, if the substitutability of skilled and unskilled labour is about 2.5, as estimated by Chiswick 
(1978C), and  high skilled labour is twice as productive as its low skilled counterpart, the corresponding values 
are 
1 0.07 L =  and  
2 0.83 L = . 
8 Note, that if  1 ε >  ( ( ) 0,1 ε ∈ ), it must be that  0.5 L <  ( 0.5 L > ) for  1 θ α <  to hold. 
* 0.26 L =  under 
the assumptions of the previous footnote. 
9 Note that we consider the case  1 ε > .   8
4. Inequality and the Quality of the Labour Force 
What is the empirical relationship between inequality and educational attainment levels in the 
labour force?
10 To address this question, we combine data on education, labour force 
characteristics and other national indicators from the OECD Statistical Compendium 2007 
with the Gini measures reported in the World Income Inequality Database (WIID  2007) 
version 2.0b compiled by the WIDER institute at the United Nations University and published 
in May 2007. The OECD Statistical Compendium provides historical statistics on a wide 
range of economic variables, such as labour force characteristics, national accounts, and 
education, mainly for developed countries that are members of OECD.  
  The WIID 2007 dataset reports Gini coefficients for a large number of countries 
covering many years of collection and estimation of this inequality indicator. In those cases 
where WIID 2007 reports multiple Gini coefficients per year and country, we prefer those of 
the highest quality if based on gross rather than net takings and earnings rather than broader 
measures of income to quantify those components of economic inequality that stem from the 
labour market as precisely as possible.
11 The combined dataset covers 29 OECD member 
states and provides 109 observations with non-missing information on the Gini coefficient the 






                                                 
10 As mentioned earlier, education measures a certain type of skills. 
11 It needs to be acknowledged that whether earnings inequality is measured at the individual or household level 
is a non-trivial issue in the context of measuring the relationship between inequality and immigration. In 
particular, immigrants often have larger households and different family structures than natives. As a result, 
measures of inequality based on individual and household earnings may give different pictures of inequality. The 
analysis of this complex relationship is beyond the scope of this chapter, however. Nevertheless, we control for 
the level (individual vs. household) at which the Gini coefficient was measured in our empirical analysis.       9
Table 1: Descriptive statistics   




Gini coefficient  31.95  6.14  109 
Share of upper secondary or higher education  72.84  17.17  109 
Share of post-secondary or higher education  50.64  20.26  109 
Share of foreign labour force  5.11  3.85  110 
Inflation rate  2.63  2.50  109 
Share of population 15-64 years of age  66.86  1.56  109 
Unemployment rate  7.49  3.53  109 
Female unemployment rate  8.37  4.61  109 
Participation rate  73.01  6.24  109 
Female participation rate  65.00  8.44  109 
Share of labour force in agriculture  5.68  4.00  109 
Government size  20.25  3.38  109 
GDP per capita, 1000s USD  19.95  12.15  109 
Note: Share of foreign labour force computed for the sample including observation for which 
information on the Gini coefficient was missing but excluding Luxembourg with unusually 
high share of foreigners. 
 
Table 1 reports basic descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. 
We observe that the mean Gini coefficient is about 32%, the mean share of workers with 
upper secondary or higher education is about 73%, the corresponding figure for post-
secondary or higher education is 51%, and the mean share of foreigners in the labour force is 
about 7%. To illustrate some basic characteristics of the relationship between inequality and 
labour force quality, we plot these two variables and compute the predicted values of a locally 
smoothed regression of the Gini coefficient on the measures of educational attainment in the 
labour force. Figures 1 and 2 confirm that for the most part inequality is a negative function of 
labour force quality for both measures of labour force quality that we apply. Indeed, this 
relationship is negative for about 80% of the observations in case of post secondary or higher 
education. The corresponding percentage for upper secondary or higher education is about 
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Figure 1: Scatter plot of the Gini coefficient as a function of the 
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Notes: OECD members except for Iceland. Data on Gini coefficients are from 
the WIID 2007 database. Data on the shares of labour force with given 
education are from the OECD Compendium. 1992-2003. Line plot of the 
nonparametric locally weighted regression of the Gini coefficient as a function 
of the share of labour force with upper secondary or higher education 
 
Figure 2: Scatter plot of the Gini coefficient as a function of the 
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Notes: OECD members except for Iceland and Mexico. Data sources see 
Figure 1. 1992-2003. Line plot of the nonparametric locally weighted 
regression of  the Gini coefficient as a function of the share of labour force 
with post-secondary or higher education. 
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Besides the distribution of educational levels in the labour force, there are other factors 
that may influence the relationship between inequality and labour force quality. Katz and 
Murphy (1992) report that increased demand for skilled workers and females as well as 
changes in the allocation of labour between industries contributed to increasing inequality in 
the US in recent years. Gustafsson and Johansson (1999) provide evidence that the share of 
industry in employment, per capita gross domestic product, international trade, the relative 
size of the public expenditures, as well as the demographic structure of the population affect 
inequality measured by the Gini coefficient across countries and years. Topel (1994) finds 
that technological and economic development determines economic inequality. 
  We examine the robustness of the observed decreasing and convex relationship with 
respect to the possible covariates mentioned in the literature by testing its stability in a formal 
regression analysis. In particular, we consider the effects of the aggregate and female labour 
force participation rates, aggregate and female unemployment rates, share of the population 
between 15 and 64 years of age, labour force in the agricultural sector, share of the 
government in the economy,
12 gross domestic product and inflation rate. We further control 
for the year, country and the method of computing the Gini coefficient, distinguishing various 
income measures, net and gross figures and the unit of analysis used to calculate any 
particular Gini coefficient.  
  Our regression analysis reported in Table 2 confirms that the observed decreasing and 
convex relationship is robust for both considered measures of education and across a number 
of model specifications, including the standard OLS model, the weighted least squares model 
with quality weights for the Gini coefficient from the WIID database, and the model with 
random country effects.
13 In particular, at high significance levels, the share of educated 
labour force is negatively and its square positively associated with inequality in all 
                                                 
12 Defined as the expenditures of the central government divided by the aggregate GDP.   12
specifications. The estimated coefficients predict the minimum of the U-shaped relationship 
between the share of skilled labour and the Gini coefficient to lie at about 80% of the labour 
force with upper secondary or higher education and 66% of the labour force with post 
secondary or higher education. In our sample these numbers imply a downward sloping 
relationship between the share of skilled labour and inequality for about 67% and 84% of the 
observations for the two applied measures of skilled labour, respectively. 
  
Table 2: Gini coefficient as a function of labour force quality 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Upper secondary and higher  Post-secondary and higher 








Share of highly educated in  -0.834***  -0.747*** -0.814*** -0.305** -0.315** -0.287** 
   the labour force  (0.162)  (0.167)  (0.171)  (0.133)  (0.122)  (0.130) 
Share of highly educated in  0.558***  0.493***  0.543***  0.235**  0.237**  0.221* 
   the labour force, sq/100  (0.147)  (0.136)  (0.139)  (0.114)  (0.114)  (0.122) 
Inflation rate  0.211  0.175  0.184  0.114  0.086  0.079 
 (0.258)  (0.242)  (0.252)  (0.237)  (0.262)  (0.282) 
Share of population   -0.523  -0.435 -0.599  -0.677  -0.442  -0.782 
   15-64 years of age  (0.482)  (0.481)  (0.490)  (0.565)  (0.507)  (0.529) 
Unemployment rate  2.948***  2.915***  2.952***  2.092***  2.193***  2.107*** 
 (0.828)  (0.522)  (0.537)  (0.705)  (0.558)  (0.590) 
Female unemployment rate  -1.867***  -1.857*** -1.882*** -1.336**  -1.418***  -1.362*** 
 (0.590)  (0.388)  (0.396)  (0.530)  (0.419)  (0.441) 
Participation rate  0.113  0.315  0.157  0.471  0.670*  0.537 
 (0.404)  (0.385)  (0.392)  (0.341)  (0.379)  (0.405) 
Female participation rate  -0.312  -0.435 -0.348  -0.466*  -0.593**  -0.524* 
 (0.319)  (0.297)  (0.307)  (0.237)  (0.281)  (0.303) 
Share of labour force in   -0.338  -0.287 -0.317*  -0.195  -0.181  -0.160 
   agriculture  (0.261)  (0.177)  (0.183)  (0.211)  (0.181)  (0.194) 
Government size  -0.411  -0.358*  -0.404**  -0.425*  -0.364*  -0.407** 
 (0.248)  (0.187)  (0.193)  (0.234)  (0.191)  (0.204) 
GDP per capita, 1000s USD  0.062  0.045  0.050  -0.081  -0.079  -0.095 
 (0.063)  (0.074)  (0.077)  (0.071)  (0.073)  (0.077) 
Gini definition controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant 115.401***  99.307***  118.887***  93.424**  68.776*  95.976*** 
 (34.235)  (34.195)  (34.021)  (40.970)  (35.815)  (37.063) 
Observations 109  109  108  109  109  108 
R-squared 0.70  0.71  0.70  0.62  0.66  0.62 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
13 This result remains robust in alternative models with weighting by country size, clustering, and fixed effects. 
The coefficients on post-secondary or higher education measure of labour force quality retain the correct signs 
but become insignificant in the fixed effect model. Results available upon request.   13
As concerns the other regressors, the results are as expected. The general 
unemployment rate is positively associated with inequality.  However, female unemployment 
rate negatively affects inequality. There is also some indication that the same holds for 
general and female participation rates. These results are probably picking up the effect of 
female selection into labour force, whereby high female unemployment and participation rates 
indicate that women with less favourable earnings opportunities are joining the labour force 
and thus increasing earnings dispersion. The size of the government is negatively associated 
with inequality, which is consistent with the hypothesis that redistribution decreases 
inequality. 
 
5. Labour Force Quality and Migration 
The composition of the labour force is a function of a number of socio-economic variables, 
among which international migration stands as one that is momentous both in terms of its 
effects and its sensitivity among the policy makers. Figures 3 and 4 indeed show that across 
OECD countries the share of labour force with upper secondary or higher educational 
attainment is a predominantly positive function of the share of foreign labour force in the 
economy, while the same relationship is monotonously increasing in case of post-secondary 
or higher education. 
To evaluate this relationship as a causal phenomenon requires, inter alia, accounting 
for the endogeneity of the migration decision, the effects of migration on the educational 
attainment of the native labour force, and the skill level of the immigrant relative to native 
workers. While such causal evaluation would require a much more detailed dataset than we 
have, we do go beyond the raw relationships presented in Figures 3 and 4. Namely, we 
evaluate the association between the share of foreign labour force and its quality controlling 
for a number of potential covariates such as the size of the government and age composition 
of the labour force. Table 3 reports evidence that the quality of the labour force increases with   14
the share of foreigners in the labour force.
14 This finding arises in all econometric models and 
for any measure of education (post-secondary or higher and upper-secondary or higher) that 
we consider.
15 As for the control variables, government size as well as GDP per capita have 
positive effects on the quality of labour force in the OLS models in columns 2 and 5, but the 
sign of these effects reverses in the random effects models. This reversal is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the association of these variables is positive between but negative within 
countries. 
 
Figure 3: Scatter plot of the share of labour force with upper 
secondary or higher education as a function of the share of 
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Notes: OECD members. Data on the shares of labour force with given 
education and foreigners are from the OECD Compendium. 1992-2003. Line 
plot of the nonparametric locally weighted regression of the Gini coefficient 









                                                 
14 The sample included observation for which the information on the Gini coefficient was missing. Luxembourg 
was dropped from the analysis due to its unusually high share of foreigners. The results are fairly robust with 
respect to inclusion of Luxembourg, though.  
15 It is also robust with respect to the fixed effects model specification as well as for the restricted sample of 
observations for which Gini coefficient is available.    15
Figure 4: Scatter plot of the share of labour force with post-
secondary or higher education as a function of the share of 
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Notes: OECD members. Data sources see Figure 3, 1992-2003. Line plot of 
the nonparametric locally weighted regression of the Gini coefficient on the 
share of labour force with post-secondary or higher education. 
 
Table 3: Share higher education as a function of share foreign labour force 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Upper secondary and higher  Post-secondary and higher 








Share  of  foreign  0.906*** 1.140*** 0.650*** 2.621*** 2.882*** 1.427*** 
      labour  force  (0.287) (0.295) (0.229) (0.334) (0.426) (0.415) 
Share of population     1.991  -0.159    1.847  -0.160 
   15-64 years of age    (1.568)  (0.460)    (1.767)  (0.860) 
Government size    1.793***  -0.569**    1.377*  -1.579*** 
   (0.557)  (0.270)  (0.764)  (0.497) 
GDP per capita, 1000s USD    0.684***  -0.002    0.470***  -0.132** 
   (0.141)  (0.032)  (0.179)  (0.060) 
Year  dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  66.283*** -112.345  85.596** 37.508*** -110.036  87.214 
  (2.750) (115.003)  (34.390)  (2.709) (128.109)  (63.902) 
Observations  110 110 109 110 110 109 
R-squared 0.04  0.27  0.73
a  0.22 0.30 0.52
a 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The relationships between inequality, the quality of the labour force and migration is 
important from both a scientific and a public policy perspective. This paper provides a 
number of notable theoretical and empirical findings about these relationships.  
First, theory predicts that inequality is decreasing in labour force quality for advanced 
economies under standard conditions. This effect arises mainly as a consequence of the 
standard economic law of diminishing marginal product of production factors: as the share of 
skilled workers in the economy increases, its price decreases and thus the wage differential 
between high and low skilled labour decreases as well. In our theoretical model migration 
affects inequality in the economy inasmuch as it changes the quality of the labour force. In 
particular, inflows of workers with average skill level above that of the receiving country 
depress inequality, and the opposite holds for low-skilled immigration.   
  Second, we confirm empirically that the relationship between inequality and the 
quality of the labour force is predominantly a negative one. This finding is evident from the 
raw data and confirmed by a more elaborate econometric analysis that accounted for a number 
of possible covariates and considered several alternative model specifications. Our results 
show that in the sample of OECD countries inequality decreases in labour force quality for 
most observations; a positive relationship shows up for observations with the quality of the 
labour above certain high threshold level.  
  How migration affects the distribution of wealth and income is one of the focal points 
of public policy debate. We evaluated the overall relationship between migration and labour 
force quality as observed across OECD countries. We find that the share of foreigners in the 
labour force and its quality as measured by educational attainment are positively associated. 
Given our finding that labour force quality and inequality are negatively associated, this result   17
implies that immigration is negatively associated with inequality. Further research is 
necessary to evaluate the causal links through which migration affects inequality. 
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Appendix: Gini coefficient and immigration 
 
Consider an economy of size 1 with L low-skilled and  1 SL = −  high-skilled workers earning 
wages  l w  and  h w , respectively, as in the main text. We denote  lh ww θ =  and normalize the 
total income to unity,  () 11 lh wL w L +− = . Consider the case with endogenous wages such that 




=−  where  0 ρ > .  
 
Proposition 
For  () )
11 11 1, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ⎡ ∈+ ⎣  the Gini coefficient equals 
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For  () (
11 11 0, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ⎤ ∈+ ⎦ the Gini coefficient equals  ( ) GL − .  
If  1 ρ ≥ ,  () 0 dG L dL >  for any  ( ) 0,1 L∈ .  
For 0 1 ρ <<  and  () 0,1 L∈ , there exist  () ( )
11 1 1 1 0, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+  and 
() ()
21 1 1 1 1, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+, such that  ( ) 0 dG L dL >  for  ( )
12 , LL L ∈ ,  () 0 dG L dL <  for 
()
12 0,1 , LL L ⎡⎤ ∈− ⎣⎦  and  () 0 dG L dL =  for  { }
12 , LL L ∈ . Also, 
1*2 LLL <<, where 
()
*1 1 1 1 1 L
ρ ρ αα
−− =+  
 
Proof: 




=− ,  ( ) ()
11 11 1, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+ implies  1 lh ww θ αα = < , that is, 
high-skilled workers earn more than low-skilled ones. Then the Lorenz curve is then defined 





















 for  [] 1 , L ∈ λ .  
Similarly as above we integrate the Lorenz curve over  [ ] 0,1 λ∈  and substitute for θ  to obtain 
()
















 to depict the Gini coefficient in this case and 
() () () ( ) ( ) ( )
() () ()
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LL L L L L L L dG L
dL LL L L








 If  () ()
11 11 0, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+ ,  1 lh ww θ αα = >  and high-skilled workers earn less 














 for  [] L , 0 ∈ λ  and 













 for  [] 1 , L ∈ λ .  
Integrating the Lorenz curve over  [ ] 0,1 λ∈  we obtain that the Gini coefficient in this case is  
() GL − .  ()
11 11 1 L
ρ ρ αα
−− =+  is the case of perfect equality. 
 For  1 ρ ≥  obviously from the expression for  ( ) dG L dL  it is positive for any 
() 0,1 L∈ .  
 For  01 ρ << , first note that  ( ) GL and  ( ) dG L dL are continuous functions for 
() 0,1 L∈ . Observe as well that  ( ) 0 GL→  for  1 L →  or  0 L →  and substituting 
()
11 11 1 L
ρ ρ αα
−− =+  into  () GL above yields  ( ) ( )
11 11 10 G
ρρ αα
−− + = . To see the former, 
note that  ()
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, where we made use of 0 1 ρ << .  
 
 
Furthermore,  () dG L dL →− ∞ whenever  1 L →  or  0 L →  and substitution yields 
() 0 dG L dL >  at  ()
11 11 1 L
ρ ρ αα
−− =+ . In fact,  ( ) dG L dL ρ = .
16 These properties imply 
that there exists at least one minimum of  ( ) GL on the interval  () ( )
11 11 0, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+  and 
at least one maximum on the interval  ( ) ( )
11 11 1, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+, where  () 0 dG L dL = .  
  To show the uniqueness of each and the maxima of  ( ) dG L dL, consider the second 
derivative of  () GL. Assume for the moment that  1 α = ; we extend the argument to the case 
where  1 α >  below. First note that  
() () () ()
() () ()
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−− + −
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  is unambiguously positive for 0 1 ρ <<  
and  () 0,1 L∈ , the sign of the second derivative is the same as the sign of   
() ( ) () ( ) () 12 1 2 2 LL L L LL
ρ ρ ρρ −− − + − + − .        ( A 1 )  
                                                 
16 This result involves tedious algebra. One can show this by evaluating  ( ) dG L dL  at 
* L , simplifying it, and 
realizing that  () () ( ) 1, 1 dG L dL f αρ ρ =+ −  where the term  ( ) ,1 f αρ= .   25
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L L L . Also, since  2 2 0 L ρ + −< and  1 ) 1 /( < − L L  
we can write  
1 21
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. This result and 
that 0 ) 1 ( < − − L L
ρ  imply  () ( ) () ( ) () 12 1 2 2 0 LL L L LL
ρ ρ ρρ −− − + − + − >  for 0 1 ρ <<  
and  () 0,0.5 L∈ . Similarly, rewriting A1 as  () ( )
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one can show that  () ( ) () ( ) () 12 1 2 2 0 LL L L LL
ρ ρ ρρ − −− + − + − <  for 0 1 ρ <<  and 
() 0.5,1 L∈ . 
 That 
22 () / 0 dGL d L>  (and thus  ( ) GL is strictly convex) for any  () 0,0.5 L∈  and 
22 () / 0 dGL d L<  (and thus  () GL is strictly concave) for any  ( ) 0.5,1 L∈ ,  () 0 dG L dL <  for 
1 L →  or  0 L →  and  () 0 dG L dL >  for  ( )
11 11 10 . 5 L
ρρ αα
−− =+ = , and the continuity of 
() dG L dL for  () 0,1 L∈  imply the desired uniqueness of the extrema and the properties of 
() dG L dL for  1 α = . 
  To extend the argument to the case where  1 α > , note that for  () 0 dG L dL =  to have 
at most two solutions within  () 0,1 L∈ , it suffices to show that 
22 () / 0 dGL d L=  has at most 
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Thus, we need to show that  




















L L H   
has at most one solution within  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ L  for  1 > α  and  1 0 < < ρ . For this to be true it 
suffices that  ) (L H  is monotonous for  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ L , that is, for LL ′ >  it must be that 
() ( ) HL HL ′ > . Consider LL ′ > . Then 
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        ( A 3 )  
is positive. If A3 is negative, we already know that A2 holds for  1 = α . Since 
1 − ρ α  is 
decreasing  for  (1, ) α ∈∞  a negative A3 and the fact that A2 holds for  1 = α  imply that A2 
holds for a negative A3 as well.  
 Therefore,  given  their continuity, 
22 () / 0 dGL d L=  has at most one and   
() 0 dG L dL =  at most two solutions and thus  ( ) GL has at most two interior extrema within 
) 1 , 0 ( ∈ L . We already know that there exists at least one minimum of  () GL on 
() ()
11 11 0, 1 L
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11 11 1, 1 L
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−− ∈+. Therefore, 
these extrema are unique and we can denote  ( ) ( )
11 1 1 1 0, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+  the minimum and   27
() ()
21 1 1 1 1, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+ the maximum. Clearly, it also follows that  
1*2 LLL <<, where 
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